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I. Introduction
At the national level, the controversies sparked by new sharing economy 
platforms such as Uber have tended to be more about socio-economic changes, than 
about the law.
Taxi users were surprised to find that they could have access to a better service 
for cheaper prices, and understandably resistant to return to the old ways. Taxi 
drivers, who invested in their business on the assumption of  a certain regulation of  
the activity, deemed it unfair to have unregulated competition on the market, which 
had to support fewer costs.
Residents of  inner cities in Europe became progressively worried about the 
desertification of  their neighborhoods, with greater and greater percentages of  
houses taken up by short-term renting to tourists. The hotel sector refused to put up 
with competition from an unregulated, non-taxed activity.
These questions present fundamental political challenges, that must first and 
foremost be dealt with at the national and local level.
At the European Union (EU) level, however, the skirmishes in this war have, 
so far, limited themselves to the legal battlefield, and it’s the Court of  Justice of  the 
EU (CJEU) which has been called to arbitrate the disputes. There is, of  course, a 
political backdrop. The national courts which have referred questions to the CJEU 
are, in essence, faced with attempts to preserve the status quo. The Court’s answers, 
inevitably, will assist, hinder or be irrelevant for these attempts.
The following sections will discuss the two judgments already delivered by the 
Court on this issue, as well as provide some thoughts on what to expect from an 
additional case which is now pending.
This paper will purposely go around the proliferous economics debate which 
has also been spurred by this topic,1 focusing exclusively on the legal issues discussed 
in judgments in question.
II. C-434/15 Uber Spain
On 20 December 2017,2 the CJEU answered a referral from a Barcelona court, 
faced with a dispute between Élite Taxi (a professional taxi drivers’ association) 
and Uber Spain, similar to many others occurring throughout the EU. Faced with 
a perceived passivity of  administrative authorities, the taxi sector sought to obtain 
judicial remedies to prevent the continuation of  Uber’s (and, by extension, its drivers’) 
unlicensed operations, maxime on the grounds that they infringed national rules on 
passenger transport and, as a result, also unfair commercial practices law.
The importance of  the case was stressed by it being decided by the Grand 
Chamber, and by the fact that 8 Member States (MS) and two supranational authorities 
intervened. It is interesting to note that the applicant in the national case, 5 MSs and 
the 2 supranational authorities all tried to persuade the Court not to reply.
The Court was asked to clarify if, under EU law, services provided by Uber were; 
“transport services”, “information society services”, or a combination of  both. It was up to 
the national court, of  course, to interpret these concepts under national law. But EU 
1 See, e.g.: J. Gata, “A economia de partilha,” Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, ano VII, n.º 26 (abr.-jun., 
2016): 193.
2  Judgment Uber Spain, case C-434/15, EU:C:2017:981.
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law could restrict the national legislator’s ability to limit Uber’s activity. Indeed, under 
EU law, if  Uber provided merely an information society service, no authorization 
could be required and no (relevant) barriers to freedom of  services could be imposed 
by MSs.3 But if  they were “transport services”, they would not benefit from the 
freedom to provide services, but would instead be under the common transport 
policy.4 MSs would be free to restrict their provision, namely imposing licensing 
requirements.5
According to the CJEU, closely following the AG’s Opinion,6 in principle, an 
app’s intermediation service is separate from the transport service itself  and tends to 
be an “information society service”.7
But, in Uber’s case, the CJEU found that there is a bundled service which 
includes more than an intermediation service.8 It doesn’t simply connect the supply 
and demand of  transport services, it organizes and provides these transport services 
itself.9 The Court justifies this finding because: (a) without the intermediary platform, 
service and demand for this type of  transport service would not exist (this is what 
the AG referred to as “creating the supply”);10 (b) Uber has decisive influence over 
the conditions under which the service is provided (control of  price and quality).11
The Court thus concluded that: “an intermediation service such as [Uber], the purpose 
of  which is to connect, by means of  a smartphone application and for remuneration, non-professional 
drivers using their own vehicle with persons who wish to make urban journeys, must be regarded as 
being inherently linked to a transport service and, accordingly, must be classified as ‘a service in the 
field of  transport’ within the meaning of  Article 58(1) TFEU. Consequently, such a service must 
3 See Articles 2(a) and 3(2) and (4) of  Directive 2000/31 of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council, of  8 June 2000, on certain legal aspects of  information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (OJ 2000 L 178/1). See also article 1(2) of  Directive 
98/34 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  22 June 1998, laying down a procedure for 
the provision of  information in the field of  technical standards and regulations (OJ 1998 L 204/37), 
replaced by Directive 2015/1535 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  9 September 
2015, laying down a procedure for the provision of  information in the field of  technical regulations 
and of  rules on Information Society services (OJ 2015 L 241/1).
4 See Articles 56(1) and 58(1) TFEU and recital 21 and articles 2(2)(d) and 9(1) of  Directive 2006/123 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  12 December 2006 on services in the internal 
market (OJ 2006 L 376/36).
5 As one author summarized it: “the categorization of  a service into a particular category affects the extent to which 
those services may be subject to regulation. The providers of  electronic intermediation services have to date benefitted 
from a regulatory approach which not only limits regulation but in some instances protects them also from liability in the 
interests of  developing the market in such services” – L. Woods, “Why Uber isn’t Appy: the ECJ defines the 
difference between transport and digital services”, EU law Analysis, December 21, 2017, available at: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/12/why-uber-isnt-appy-ecj-defines.html.
6 Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case C-434/15 Uber Spain EU:C:2017:364. 
7 Case C-434/15 Uber Spain EU:C:2017:981, paras. 34-35.
8 Doctrine focused on the analysis of  national law had also been arriving at the same conclusion – 
see, e.g.: J. Campos Carvalho, “Enquadramento jurídico da atividade da Uber em Portugal”, Revista de 
Concorrência e Regulação anoVII, n.º 26 (2016): 221.
9 Idem, paras 37-38.
10 Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case C-434/15 Uber Spain EU:C:2017:364, para 43.
11 Judgment Uber Spain, case C-434/15, paras. 39-40. In what concerns price control, in a note which 
may be of  importance for future cases, it must be stressed that, as recognized by the AG (para 50), 
Uber drivers may opt for a lower price. So, the issue is not that Uber “sets” the prices; it is that it 
recommends a price which drivers are “unlikely” to divert from. Importantly, the AG qualified the 
type and degree of  control exercised by Uber as typical, for all practical purposes, of  a “traditional 
employer-employee relationship” (para 52).
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be excluded from the scope of  Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123 and Directive 2000/31”.12
The case’s outcome was, by no means, a foregone conclusion. The Court made 
it seem simple. But one should remember that the Court had previously found that 
the online sale of  goods was an information society service, even though the goods 
were then physically delivered.13 According to AG Szpunar,14 the decisive criteria to 
distinguish between the two situations is the identification of  the “main component” 
of  the exchange. He argued that a sale and purchase agreement is the main component, 
with the delivery being incidental (mere performance of  the obligation), making it 
an online service. By contrast, the performance of  the transportation service itself  
is the main component, the online contract being merely incidental secondary or 
preparatory thereto.
This is, arguably, an instance of  splitting of  hairs,15 which may account for why 
the CJEU avoided this discussion. In so doing, however, it was not entirely honest. At 
least the AG tried to provide an explanation to distinguish previous cases. The Court 
was quite unclear on why Uber’s service, even if  understood as a bundle, should not 
be deemed an information society service, because it is contracted online.16
Finally, it should be noted that the Court hinted that, as has happened in the 
past when national laws create obstacles to the circulation of  products/services in 
the internal market, for which the Treaty does not provide an efficient solution, 
the way to get around this is for the EU legislator to step up and harmonize the 
regulation of  Uber’s activity across the EU.17
III. C-320/16 Uber France
While the previous case was still pending, a court from Lille placed the Court 
with additional questions. The CJEU replied, also by Grand Chamber, on 10 April 
2018.18
The context of  the referral was somewhat different. France had legislated, in 
12 Idem, operative part. It should be noted that these criteria are similar, but not identical (less 
demanding), to those put forward by the European Commission in its Communication A European 
agenda for the collaborative economy, COM(2016) 356 final, 2 June 2016.
13 CJEU, case C-108/09 Ker-Optika EU:C:2010:725, paras. 22 and 28. As summarized in G. Ester, 
“The ‘decisive influence’ test: the ECJ judgment on Uber,” International Litigation Newsletter (May, 
2018), available at: https://www.perezllorca.com/wp-content/uploads/es/actualidadPublicaciones/
ArticuloJuridico/Documents/180503-iba-international-litigation-the-decisive-influence-test-the-ecj-
judgment-on-uber-ger.pdf, the CJEU here “ruled that the sale of  contact lenses over the internet qualified 
as an information society service and, therefore, the Hungarian regulation which established that the marketing of  
contact lenses could only be carried out in establishments specializing in medical instruments was contrary to Directive 
2000/31”.
14 Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case C-434/15 Uber Spain EU:C:2017:364, paras. 35-37.
15 It seems artificial to argue, as the AG does, that the objective of  liberalization of  information 
society services, in the case of  these services, could not be achieved because MS would “be free to render 
its pursuit impossible by imposing rules on the transport activity” (para. 65). It seems to me that this is precisely 
the core of  the dispute. If  it were an information society service, MS would not be free to impose 
restrictions except as provided by EU rules on information society services. The distinctions became 
even more tenuous when, in his subsequent Opinion, the AG tried to say that relationships between 
a franchisor and its franchisees should also not be treated as Uber (Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case 
Uber France, case C-320/16, para. 22, EU:C:2017:511).
16 With similar criticism, Ester, supra note 14.
17 Judgment Uber Spain, case C-434/15, paras. 46-47.
18 Judgment Uber France, case C-320/16.
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2014, to make it a crime to provide a service such as Uber’s, if  the drivers were not 
licensed to provide transport services under national law.19
Fundamentally, the issue was the same. And, indeed, the CJEU’s ruling was 
extremely succinct. It merely reaffirms the previous judgment, noting that the 
services in this case were essentially the same, and drawing the same consequences.20
It concluded: “Article 1 of  Directive 98/34 (…) and Article 2(2)(d) of  Directive 
2006/123 (…) must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of  national law that lays down 
criminal penalties for the organization of  a system for putting customers in contact with persons 
carrying passengers by road for remuneration using vehicles with fewer than 10 seats, without 
being authorized to do so, concerns a ‘service in the field of  transport’ in so far as it applies to an 
intermediation service that is provided by means of  a smartphone application and forms an integral 
part of  an overall service the principal element of  which is the transport service. Such a service is 
excluded from the scope of  application of  those directives”.21
The case could have been tackled somewhat differently, if  the Court had 
approached it as the AG did.22 Considering how it did approach it, the case turned out 
to be virtually identical to the previous one. Still, there were important psychological 
differences between the two. It is one thing to say that MSs are free to impose rules 
restricting the cross-border supply of  bundles of  information society and transport 
services. It is perhaps harder to say that they are free to send citizens of  other MSs 
to jail for infringing those rules. And yet, failing a reversal of  the prior judgment, that 
was the unavoidable conclusion.
On a final note, a third case was submitted to the Court, relating not to the 
UberPop service, as the previous two, but to Uber Black. However, the German 
court withdrew its referral.23
IV. What’s to come: C-390/18 Airbnb, and etc.
Once again, a French first instance court has asked the Court to clarify the 
applicability of  EU law to the shared economy. This time, the case, which is still 
pending, concerns Airbnb.24 Just as before, hotel associations are arguing that Airbnb 
is providing its services in violation of  French national rules on real estate agents 
and intermediaries, which namely requires licensing. The issue is whether Airbnb’s 
platform should be considered to provide an information society service and thus 
covered by the freedom to provide services. In other words, how does Airbnb fare 
under the test set out by the Court in its Uber cases?
To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify the test set out by the CJEU.
To begin with, I find it meaningful that the Court stated that, as a rule, 
intermediary apps are information society services. There are exceptions to this 
rule, and Uber is one of  them, but I would argue that such exceptions should be 
19 Subject to criminal penalties such as imprisonment, a fine, the prohibition on exercising a social or 
professional activity, the closure of  the undertaking’s establishment and the confiscation of  property.
20 CJEU, case C-320/16 Uber France EU:C:2018:221, paras. 18-26.
21 Idem, operative part.
22 The case brought up a novel issue, about whether the French rules relating to these should have 
been notified as rules on services within the meaning of  the provisions of  EU law on technical 
notification – see: Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case C-320/16 Uber France EU:C:2017:511, which was 
largely focused on an autonomous analysis of  this issue.
23 Judgment Uber Germany, case C-371/17, EU:C:2018:313.
24 Judgment Airbnb, case C-390/18 (lodged on 13 June 2018).
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interpreted restrictively.
When looking at such an intermediary app or online service, the issue is 
not whether it is, by itself, an information society service – that is the necessary 
consequence of  its nature. The real issue is whether that information society service 
forms part of  a bundle, a “composite service”, including an online and an offline 
service. This is the question which the Court answered.
According to the Court, there is a composite service (and, thus, for practical 
purposes, the direct supply of  the service by the app provider to the ultimate clients) 
if  two cumulative requisites are met:
a) The platform itself  is a “market maker”25
This is a problematic requisite, since it’s never met in absolute terms. The 
decision as to whether a platform creates or merely expands/optimizes the market 
will always be a matter of  degree. Surely, the Court was not suggesting that private 
drivers would not be able to offer their unlicensed services on the passenger transport 
by road market without Uber. The reality of  several MSs, at least historically, shows 
this not to be so. The issue is that Uber and similar platforms make it so much easier 
to do so. But that is not the same as creating the market.
On the other hand, we cannot reduce this requisite of  market creation to saying 
that without the app, there wouldn’t be a market for transport services provided by 
an app. That would be tautological. It is precisely the fact that the services provided 
through the app compete with services provided through other means that causes 
taxi drivers to want to suppress those competing services.
More importantly, whether or not an app or online platform creates a market, 
which would not be able to exist without it, should have no bearing on determining 
whether the downstream offline activity is independent and dissociable, in its 
functioning, from the upstream online activity. By the same rationale, the market 
for any online service or bundle only exists because, upstream, there are internet 
providers, but this should have no relevance in the discussion of  whether these 
activities constitute a composite.
I would argue, therefore, that the crux of  the matter lies in the second requisite.26
In any case, AG Szpunar has argued that Airbnb and, in fact, all “platforms for the 
purchase of  flights or hotel bookings”, do not pass this test, since the app/online service, 
in these cases, does not create the market (hotels, rooms and flights are marketed in 
other ways) or limit access to the market.27
b) The app/online service exercises “decisive influence” over the offline 
service being provided
If  an app or online platform controls, at least to a large extent, the price, 
quantity and quality of  the service provided, it is deemed to exert decisive influence 
over the provision of  that service, with the consequence that it must be analyzed as 
a bundle or composite service.
AG Szpunar argued that this test is not met by Airbnb and the like, because, 
unlike Uber, such platforms offer a real choice between several providers, with 
25 In the expression of  C. Busch, “The Sharing Economy at the CJEU: Does Airbnb Pass the ‘Uber 
Test’? – Some Observations on the Pending case C-390/18 – Airbnb Ireland,” Journal of  European 
Consumer and Market Law, vol. 7, issue 4 (2018): 172.
26 Similarly, see Busch, supra note 26.
27 Opinion of  AG Szpunar in judgment Uber Spain, case C-434/15, paras. 33-34 and 57-60, EU:C:2017:364.
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heterogenous products/services, and merely connect supply and demand, agents 
remaining wholly independent when determining their terms of  supply.28
Despite what some authors have suggested,29 all indications point to the fact 
that the Airbnb judgment will say that an app/online platform such as this one does 
qualify as an information society service.30
But the discussion doesn’t really stop here. As noted above, there is a hidden 
part of  the debate, which was addressed by the AG, but which the Court tackled only 
very superficially.
Regardless of  whether an activity is provided wholly by one undertaking 
(e.g., selling on its website and mailing the products to the clients), or whether it 
is provided as a composite where the app/online service has decisive influence 
over the downstream service providers, one still needs to ask which is the principal 
component: the online or the offline one. The Court decided this implicitly in the 
first judgment, and in the second judgment it specifically said that the app was the 
“principal element”. But why is it? AG Szpunar’s attempt to explain this part was rather 
unpersuasive.
Why is ordering a toaster online the principle activity (rather than having it 
physically delivered), but riding a taxi is the principle activity (rather than ordering 
it online)? Is this a distinction between goods and services? Does it mean that all 
services contracted online will not be the principal element of  the contracted bundle?
The problem has not been made easier by the CJEU’s judgment in case 
Vanderborght, where the Court found that online advertising for dental services was 
an information society service, distinct from the provision of  the dental services 
themselves.31
The Court has avoided this issue, and in so doing, it has done a poor service 
to legal certainty in the future, not just for apps and online platforms, but for the 
concept of  information society services and for e-Commerce as a whole. The partial 
upside is that this issue only becomes relevant if  the Court first determines that we 
are in the presence of  a composite service, i.e. that the decisive influence test is met. 
Thus, the Court will be able to avoid this discussion in a large number of  cases (such 
as the Airbnb one).
V. Conclusion
The Court’s judgments split academics. Empirically, it seems to me that most 
scholars who had approached the problem primarily from a national law perspective, 
agreed with the rulings. But even among those specialized on EU law, opinions 
diverged.32 And while some of  the differing views seemed to come from voices 
which professionally sided with Uber,33 others seemed to independently arrive at 
28 Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case C-434/15 Uber Spain EU:C:2017:364, paras. 33-34 and 57-60.
29 See, e.g.: J. M. Regules, “The ECJ’s Uber judgment,” 2018, available at https://www.maastrichtuniversity.
nl/blog/2018/04/ecj%E2%80%99s-uber-judgment.
30 As is thoroughly argued in Busch, supra note 26.
31 CJUE, case C-339/15 Vanderborght EU:C:2017:335. See also Opinion of  AG Szpunar in case 
C-320/16 Uber France EU:C:2017:511, paras. 18-21.
32 For a favorable opinion, see, e.g.: P. Hacker, “UberPop, UberBlack, and the Regulation of  Digital 
Platforms after the Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi Judgment of  the CJEU,” European Review of  
Contract Law, vol. 14, issue 1 (2018): 80.
33 See, e.g., D. Geradin, “For a Facts-Based Analysis of  Uber’s Activities in the EU: Addressing Some 
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cogent arguments against the Court’s position.
On the one hand, some of  the opposing voices seemed to overestimate or 
misunderstand the impact of  the judgment. It’s unfair to say, for example, that these 
judgments amount, in practice, to a “de facto ban on Uber’s activities”,34 as demonstrated 
by the fact that Uber continued to operate in several MSs.
Setting aside the details of  the legal justification, I prefer to look upon it as a 
balanced assessment of  the current equilibrium in the transfer of  sovereign powers 
from the Member States to the EU, and a welcomed restraint on the part of  the 
Court to expansively interpret Internal Market provisions in such a way which would 
circumvent that negotiated transfer and excessively restrict the freedom of  MSs to 
regulate an activity which, so far, they did not intend to allow the EU to regulate. As 
the Court rightly pointed out, EU institutions are empowered to legislate so as to 
harmonize the provision of  services such as Uber’s across the EU’s territory – all that 
is lacking is the will to do so, which emphasizes the need to respect the differences 
in national approaches to the issue.
It so happens that, as a citizen and consumer of  taxi services, I dislike this 
outcome. But, from a legal perspective, I find it reasonable. And I am lucky to live 
in a country where the Government has shown itself  sensitive to the need to open 
up the market to the efficiencies and improvements brought by apps such as Uber.
On the other hand, I agree that there are reasons to be concerned about the 
lack of  clarity and the insecurity created by these judgments, in so far as other 
platforms and services are concerned. This decisive influence test may turn out to be 
a convenient way for the Court to distinguish those activities which it believes MSs 
should have control over, from those which it believes they shouldn’t. But one can’t 
help find it somewhat artificial.
Schaub argued: “the decision of  the CJEU to exclude the booking application from the 
scope of  the e-Commerce Directive is incorrect and unnecessary. Possibly, this decision was prompted 
by the desire to ensure that Member States can apply and enforce national rules relating to transport 
services. Yet, classification of  Uber as an information society service would not have precluded 
this”.35
This final point is, I believe, the crucial one. There is no real reason to justify 
distinguishing between Uber and Airbnb, for example. As long as these undertakings 
cooperate with the authorities and provide information on their service providers, 
which they can be compelled to do under national law, MSs remain free to regulate 
and tax the activity of  undertakings and persons providing services via the app/
online platform, which is exactly what has happened with Airbnb. Against this 
backdrop, one may perhaps argue that it was Uber’s aggressive and non-transparent 
corporate policy that caused it to be treated differently. As a matter of  policy, that 
may be reasonable but, as a matter of  law, it does not seem entirely coherent.
Misconceptions,” CPI Antitrust Chronicle (September 2017). 
34 M. Colangelo and M. Maggiolino, “Uber in Europe: Are There Still Judges in Luxembourg?,” CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle (May 2018).
35 M. Y. Schaub, “Why Uber is an information society service,” Journal of  European Consumer and Market 
Law, vol. 7, issue 3 (2018): 109.
